Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
English Faculty Research and Publications

English, Department of

6-2021

Science Fiction and Utopia in the Anthropocene
Gerry Canavan
Marquette University, gerard.canavan@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/english_fac
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Canavan, Gerry, "Science Fiction and Utopia in the Anthropocene" (2021). English Faculty Research and
Publications. 560.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/english_fac/560

Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
English Faculty Research and Publications/College of Arts and Sciences
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION.
Access the published version via the link in the citation below.
American Literature, Vol. 93, No. 2 (June 1, 2021): 255–282. DOI. This article is © Duke University Press
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Duke
University Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted
elsewhere without express permission from Duke University Press.

Science Fiction and Utopia in the
Anthropocene
Gerry Canavan

Department of English, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Abstract

This article takes up science-fictional visions of the future against the “deep time” of the Anthropocene
in order to explore the possibilities for utopia that remain in an era that only seems capable of
producing necrofuturological dread. The piece surveys a wide range of contemporary literature and
film; the key prose authors discussed are Octavia E. Butler, Margaret Atwood, Ernest Callenbach, and
Kim Stanley Robinson. These texts are used to identify patterns of thought that have become habitual
in the cultural moment of the Anthropocene, and they are explored as critiques of, alternatives to, and
lines of flight away from its more pessimistic ideological formations.

Keywords

Octavia E. Butler, Margaret Atwood, Ernest Callenbach, Kim Stanley Robinson, ecological humanities

It is still an open question whether man will be able to survive the exceedingly complex and
unstable ecological conditions he has created for himself. If he fails in this task, interplanetary

archaeologists of the future will classify our planet as one on which a very long and very stable
period of small-scale hunting and gathering was followed by an apparently instantaneous
efflorescence of technology and society leading rapidly to extinction. ‘Stratigraphically,’ the
origin of agriculture and thermonuclear destruction will appear as essentially simultaneous.
—Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore, Man the Hunter (1969)
In The Human Condition (1958), Hannah Arendt (1998: 265) takes up the twentieth century’s
development of a “cosmic standpoint outside nature itself,” which is tokened in her introduction by
the Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik. She argues that we now see ourselves through Sputnik’s
eyes, an interplanetary, alienated gaze from nowhere rather than from the grounded, terrestrial
standpoint that had constituted “the human condition” through all of human history (1–6). Arendt
argues that such a universal cosmic standpoint—the Earth as viewed from space, a scale from which
both human lives and human accomplishments are invisible—is a deep and abiding threat to “the
human” as such: an obliteration both of humanity’s place in its material context and of humankind’s
potential to undertake effective and meaningful action toward its own betterment (268). Here Arendt
finds the real world playing catch-up to science fiction: “What is new is only that one of this country’s
most respectable newspapers finally brought to its front page what up to then had been buried in the
highly non-respectable literature of science fiction (to which, unfortunately, nobody yet has paid the
attention it deserves as a vehicle of mass sentiments and mass desires)” (2); the writers and readers of
science fiction, she suggests, had perfected this more cosmic way of thinking long before the Sputnik
launch.
More recently, Ursula K. Heise has taken up this science-fictional, cosmic standpoint in a more positive
register, noting the way that images of the Earth from space have helped to spur global environmental
consciousness. The spatial separation of the viewer’s gaze from the planet—as in the
1968 Earthrise photograph taken by the Apollo 8 crew member William Anders, or the 1972 The Blue
Marble snapped by the Apollo 17 crew, or even the Pale Blue Dot taken by Voyager 1 in 1990, in which
a six-billion-kilometer-distant Earth is but a single pixel, barely visible against a field of total darkness—
represents the Earth as an immediately graspable totality, in which all differences between race, class,
gender, nation, ideology, and ecosystem have been completely smoothed away in favor of a new,
cosmopolitan universality. “Set against a black background like a precious jewel in a case of velvet,”
Heise (2008: 22) writes of The Blue Marble, “the planet here appears as a single entity, united, limited,
and delicately beautiful.” Here, too, of course, science fiction was first; science fiction had imagined
the Earth as viewed from space from practically the moment it was first recognizable as a genre, in
such still-famous works as Jules Verne’s Around the Moon (1870) and H. G. Wells’s The War of the
Worlds (1898).
The central argument of this article is that contemporary thought is currently undergoing a conceptual
dislocation much like the one Arendt and Heise identify, similarly conversant in cutting-edge science
and similarly conditioned by the science-fictional imagination. The central division between that
cosmic standpoint and our own is that the flattening power of contemporary universalism is predicated
on temporal rather than spatial separation from the scale of human life: rather than the view of the
Earth from the standpoint of deep space, ours is a view of the present from the standpoint of deep
time. This is ultimately the view from a radically posthuman (and antihuman) future in which the

human race has entirely disappeared. This standpoint, the one scientists and ecological humanists have
popularly dubbed the Anthropocene, thereby registers a radical hollowing-out of the utopian potential
of futurity—nicely befitting, perhaps, a cultural moment in which not only “the end of history”
(Fukuyama 1989) but also the near-term imminence of human extinction increasingly seems to be a
matter of scientific certainty.
If Arendt was surprised to find science fiction coming to terms with the onrush of the future faster and
more fully than the more respected mainstream commenters of her day, we should not be. By now, I
think, we critics understand science fiction’s social role as a site for attempting to predict, premediate,
resist, and even control the future. In this article, I consider recent developments in literary science
fiction and utopian thought in the face of the Anthropocene, and I explore the ways in which the
energizing potentiality of science fiction’s famous “utopian impulse” (see Jameson 2005, especially 2–
4) might yet be recovered out of a world-historical system whose coordinates now seem not just antiutopian but out-and-out apocalyptic—indeed, as an event which we have become so habituated
toward that we imagine it as a catastrophe that has already happened, against which no point of
political resistance seems imaginable.
My approach is both taxonomic and critical; I want to identify patterns of thought that have become
habitual in the cultural moment of the Anthropocene as well as critiques of, alternatives to, and lines
of flight away from these ideological structures. As we will see in the next section, a core problematic
for thinking about the Anthropocene has been the question of universalism, the notion of a single
human species operating along a linear narrative of social and technological progress that culminates
in political liberalism and twentieth-century/twenty-first-century technoculture. The Anthropocene, as
it is commonly formulated, both affirms and denies this incredibly flattened understanding of planetary
history, in different ways; within this theoretical paradigm we can thus find both the ossification of
toxic Eurocentric and white-supremacist ideologies as well as the possibility that new ways of
understanding the human species, its history, and its relationship with other forms of life might
emerge from this moment of collective crisis. In this way, the very idea of “the Anthropocene” might
be best understood as itself a space of science-fictional imagination, which, like any science fiction,
articulates a space of world-historical difference to either confirm or challenge the political-cultural
assumptions of the society that produced it (indeed, if not doing both at the same time).
I begin by articulating the theoretical paradigm of the Anthropocene as it has gained currency in the
contemporary academy and exploring some of its philosophical corollaries that have gone
underdiscussed and overlooked. I then turn to Anthropocenic ways of thinking in several influential
works of contemporary science fiction, especially paradigmatic work by Margaret Atwood and Octavia
E. Butler, to demonstrate how ideas now associated with the Anthropocene (even when that term goes
unrecognized or unnamed) have infused the futurological narratives our society now produces. In Part
Two, I lay out major utopian and quasi-utopian strategies to resist the cosmic pessimism of the
Anthropocene in order to explain how science fiction has attempted to imagine hopeful possibilities for
a future that now seems preemptively and permanently foreclosed, not simply by political failure or by
human frailty but by scientific law. This is intended as a broad overview of the field rather than as a
deep critical dive into any particular work; the ambition of this piece is to use science fiction as a tool
to help us better read and understand the modalities of the Anthropocene itself.

Part One: Welcome to the Anthropocene

Geologists, climatologists, evolutionary biologists, and other scientists who study what John McPhee
dubbed the “deep time” of planetary history use a geologic time scale to periodize the immense fourbillion-year history of Earth as it appears to us through rock stratigraphy and the fossil record. The
largest unit, the eon, can span an incomprehensible billions of years; eons are then progressively
subdivided into eras, periods, epochs, and ages, the last still numbering in the millions of years. These
divisions tend to be organized around superhistorical ruptures: the first emergence of life
approximately four billion years ago, for instance, marks the boundary between the lifeless Hadean
eon and the Archean eon populated by single-celled organisms, while the mass extinction event that
killed the dinosaurs punctuates the end of the Cretaceous period at the close of the Mesozoic era,
inaugurating the Cenozoic era in which human life evolved. Our species took its present form in the
Pleistocene epoch, which began approximately two and a half million years ago and ended (just)
eleven thousand years ago; the current geological epoch is the Holocene, dated to the retreat of the
glaciers at the end of the last ice age.
To think at such scales is to radically decenter the white, European subject that once so easily imagined
itself to be identical with both “history” and “the human.” As the epigraph from Lee and DeVore
attests, from the perspective of geologic time the human species as a whole exists only in a sliver of a
sliver of the most recent flash of time, with the recorded history of “civilization” encompassing an even
smaller instantaneous moment still. Rather than being the sacred heirs of the universe, beloved by
God, Homo sapiens becomes recast instead as but its most recent epiphenomenon, as miniscule in the
immensity of geologic time as Earth itself is with respect to the hundreds of millions of stars in the
universe. Geologic time can thus be seen as the culmination of the cosmic decentering that began with
Copernicus’s proof that the Earth revolves around the sun and not the other way around; the more we
learn about the size of the universe, the less significant the time and space taken up by the human
species appear. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, decolonization movements and
postcolonial thinking have similarly worked to “provincialize Europe,” in Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2000)
famous phrase, fragmenting the white fantasy of a universal human subject and teleological human
progress into nonlinear, multi-subject narratives that cannot privilege either whiteness or Europe; we
might be tempted to say that geologic time provincializes the human, or even the Earth as such,
radically decentering the historical moment called modernity and revealing it to have no particular
cosmic importance whatsoever.
But recent propositions in geologic thinking have suggested a philosophical countermove that
reintroduces humanity as a collective actor who can be recognized on this kind of immense geological
scale after all. Paul J. Crutzen’s influential Nature article “The Geology of Mankind” (2002) proposed
that the Holocene can now be said to have ended, superseded by the epoch he calls “the
Anthropocene” (23). The Anthropocene marks the moment that the activities of the human species
become visible in the geologic record: the moment that the logic of Copernican decentering is reversed
and we become geologic actors after all. Homo sapiens evolved in the Pleistocene and gained its
tremendous technological powers in the Holocene—but with the full realization of those powers
toward total world-transformation we are now in the Anthropocene. While the Anthropocene of
course remains a contentious taxonomic category, the concept has been embraced by many scientists,

with such bodies as the Geological Society of London taking steps toward formal recognition of the
Anthropocene as an official geologic epoch (see Zalasiewicz et al. 2008)—and despite its informal
status the terminology already possesses a tremendous amount of currency, particularly for scholars
working in the ecological humanities.
Crutzen’s (2002: 23) article suggests the Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth century as the
beginning of the Anthropocene, “when analyses of air trapped in polar ice showed the beginning of
growing global concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane” as a result of human burning of fossil
fuels. Another proposed date is 1945, when the beginning of the atomic age left radiological evidence
of our existence that will last for millennia (see Zalasiewicz et al. 2010), or perhaps later still in the
twentieth century, when the widespread use of materials like plastic, glass, and Styrofoam in consumer
objects created a stratigraphic layer of detritus and trash that will never break down. Still others have
argued that the date of the Anthropocene should be much earlier, decoupled from modern
technoculture and perhaps almost completely coterminous with the Holocene itself, on the basis that
such prehistorical events as the mass extinction of megafauna in the North American continent and the
complex forestry practices of precontact Native Americans will by themselves be recognizable to future
observers as the handiwork of an intelligent species (as in Doughty, Wolf, and Field 2010). A 2015
article in Nature suggests an unhappier middle option: circa 1492, when the first contact between
Europe and America and the consequent death of tens of millions of Native Americans led to
reforestation across the Western Hemisphere, which, a century later, may have caused the significant
dip in global temperatures often dubbed the “Little Ice Age” (Lewis and Maslin 2015).
The psychic benefit of the Anthropocene as a concept is an unexpected reversal of the deflationary
logic of the Copernican and Darwinian Revolutions in thought: the Anthropocene and all its attendant
ecological crises—climate change, mass extinction, ocean acidification, all the rest—is the “proof” that
we as a species are not in fact insignificant but are instead the most important superhistorical force
currently on the planet. For the white European subject, missing perhaps his old status as the
protagonist of species history, the Anthropocene could be seen to “undo” the provincialization of
Europe and uncritically recenter modernity, a flattening Chakrabarty (2009: 219–20) himself has noted
as a possible risk of thinking climate change from the perspective of the postcolonial: “How do we
relate to a universal history of life—to universal thought, that is—while retaining what is of obvious
value in our postcolonial suspicion of the universal?” Properly thinking the Anthropocene requires one
to hold universality and locality in permanent dialectical suspension around this contested notion of a
human species that both is and is not identical with contemporary global capitalism.
But news of the Anthropocene, while from a certain perspective a perversely comforting reassertion of
humanity’s cosmic importance, also carries with it some steep philosophical costs. First, the version of
human superhistorical activity it foregrounds is almost exclusively a negative one: to the extent that
human activity is visible in the fossil or stratigraphic records, it is through destructive anti-ecological
acts of mass pollution and mass extinction. It is for this reason that Jason W. Moore (2017) has
proposed the alternative name Capitalocene for the Anthropocene, both to highlight what is to blame
(a particular system of social organization, using particularly toxic sources of energy and producing
particularly permanent types of goods) and who is to blame (the rich Western nations, which have
inflicted ecological degradation upon the rest of humanity without even allowing them to share in

what now seems like a very temporary period of extreme wealth). Donna J. Haraway (2016) goes
further still, offering the name “Chthulucene” to describe the world Capital is creating: monstrosity on
an unthinkably large scale.1 As Chakrabarty (2009: 222) goes on to note in his own dialectical
consideration of the interplay between universality and locality, the sense of universalism that
emerges from climate change is “a universal that arises from a shared sense of a catastrophe” that
cannot be allowed to “subsume particularities”—i.e., cannot allow us to return to naive white
universalism or to let capital off the hook for what it has done. It must be a “negative universal
history.”
Additionally—and perhaps worse still for any human-centered analysis of the concept—the
Anthropocene implies posthuman time; the Anthropocene is not simply the moment that we recognize
ourselves in the fossil record but the moment that other observers, looking backward from many
thousands or millions of years in the future, would be able to “see” us as well, without having already
known we were here. In this sense the Anthropocene is worse than a view from nowhere; it is a view
from the standpoint of human extinction. Needless to say, this is if anything an even more radical
provincialization of the present than we started with! To say “the Anthropocene” is in some sense to
name ourselves and our society as all already dead.
I would thus suggest the assertion of the Anthropocene as a kind of neo-Romantic revival of the
melancholic fascination with death, illness and morbidity, ruin, and a vanishing natural world that
characterized so much Anglo-American literature (especially poetry) in the nineteenth century. The
Anthropocene is in fact the perfection of the Romantic way of thinking, allowing us access to a version
of the temporal sublime that goes beyond any Grecian urn, ruined monastery, or shattered colossus in
the desert—and, like the Romantics’ use of the sublime, the assertion of the Anthropocene seeks to reinject an appreciation for the sacredness of life into a world that seems to have entirely crushed such
valuation. However, the shock of the sublime in the Anthropocene has a somewhat different affect
than the one Romantic poetry activates: rather than seeing ourselves as divine, or a necessary and
organic part of a holistic tapestry of life, cultural production in the Anthropocene tends to figure the
human as a cancerous deviation from a unifying natural order—the nightmare kings of a horrid empire
of plastic trash and toxic poisons.
In this way the Anthropocene can be best understood not as a break with universalist history at all but
rather as its final violent extension even to the white, metropolitan subjects who once believed
themselves to be safely immune to its horrors. This is the core of Kathryn Yusoff’s critique of the
concept of the Anthropocene as it has been advanced in the academy, in her call for its decolonization:
If the Anthropocene proclaims a sudden concern with exposures of environmental harm to
white liberal communities, it does so in the wake of histories in which these harms have been
knowingly exported to black and brown communities under the rubric of civilization, progress,
modernization, and capitalism. The Anthropocene might be seen to offer a dystopic future that
laments the end of the world, but imperialism and settler colonialism have been ending worlds
for as long as they have been in existence. The Anthropocene as a politically infused geology
and scientific/popular discourse is just now noticing the extinction it has chosen to continually
overlook in the making of its modernity and freedom. (Yusoff 2018: xii)

The “racial blindness” of the Anthropocene as a concept, Yusoff (2018: xii) argues, does more harm
than good if it cannot come to terms with imperialist and white settler history—hence her call for a A
Billion Black Anthropocenes or None.
The depressive logical consequences of embracing the Anthropocene as a framing for understanding
our time can be seen clearly in Margaret Atwood’s recent flash fiction “Time Capsule Found on the
Dead Planet,” published in The Guardian on the occasion of the Copenhagen climate conference in
2009. Atwood’s very short story traces a history of human beings—imagined, contra Yusoff’s warning,
as a singular “we”—that undercuts both the familiar rhetoric of inevitable historical progress and
science-fictional discourses of interstellar colonization. From the first age, in which we “created gods”
and during which “a million birds flew over us . . . a million fish swam in our seas,” the human story is
recast instead as a narrative of degeneration and mass death. In the second age “we created money”;
in the third age “money became a god” that “began to eat things. It ate whole forests, croplands and
the lives of children. It ate armies, ships and cities. No one could stop it. To have it was a sign of grace.”
Finally the age of the money god creates the fourth age, our time, the Anthropocene, in which human
creative potential can only be turned toward the production of death: “In the fourth age we created
deserts. . . . At last all wells were poisoned, all rivers ran with filth, all seas were dead; there was no
land left to grow food.”
And so the fifth age is an age of total silence. The address of the short turns from “we” to “you,” as
“we” have all died. “You who have come here from some distant world, to this dry lakeshore and this
cairn, and to this cylinder of brass, in which on the last day of all our recorded days I place our final
words.” These unknown and unknowable aliens are the full and final gaze of the Anthropocene,
discovering in the Earth a world that has been ruined by human activity. These aliens have achieved
the dream of science fiction that the twentieth century placed so much imaginative investment in: they
have ascended from their home world and accessed the full wonders of the cosmos. But humans
didn’t. Those last words, inscribed on the capsule, are a bitter rebuke to a civilization that fantasized
about progress but was able to produce only death: “Pray for us, who once, too, thought we could fly.”

Parables of the Anthropocene

A similar deconstruction of the Star Trekian “consensus future”2 of social and technological progress
culminating in interstellar colonization can be found in Octavia E. Butler’s Parable of the Sower, an
influential Afrofuturist novel that attempts to wed utopian thinking with the bleak near-term prospects
for the planetary ecosystem, global capitalism, and US civic institutions. The two novels in the Parables
series are Butler’s most predictive works of science fiction; Butler (1998a) says she wrote them in the
speculative spirit of Robert A. Heinlein’s famous “if this goes on.” (“And if it’s true,” she adds, “if it’s
anywhere near true, we’re all in trouble.”) The situation of the novels is a slow-motion apocalypse that,
early in the second book, is called “the Pox”—global warming, economic depression, and
neoliberalism’s accelerative hollowing-out of the public sphere have conspired to leave America in a
state of near-total collapse (Butler 1998b: 8–9).3 The chaotic, multidirectional violence of American
empire has encroached from the margins closer and closer toward the metropole; as the first novel
(Parable of the Sower) opens, heavily armed, once-suburban gated communities offer the only refuge
from the disastrous decline of late capitalism—and as the novel begins even these havens are
beginning to be breached. The protagonist of the Parables is Lauren Olamina, a young, disabled Black

woman living in one of these privileged enclaves, who suffers from a psychological disease that causes
her to experience other people’s pleasures and pains. But this empathic weakness is simultaneously
her strength—it opens up the possibility of new and genuine ethics, and of a better world than this
one. Over the course of Sower, Lauren Olamina—driven from her home into the ruined highways of
America following the raiding and burning of her home suburb by “pyros”—develops and begins to
evangelize a new religion called Earthseed, which attempts to foster livable lives in this fallen world
and insists that both “Life is Change” and “God Is Change” (Butler 1993: 3). The religion takes is name
from a redemptive belief in that oldest and most cherished of science-fictional dreams, the
colonization of the stars (74–75; “The Destiny of Earthseed / is to take root among the stars”).
Earthseed is constituted by a Darwinian recognition of the eternal flux of life as well as a postDarwinian attempt to seize control of that flux and put it toward human ends, first and foremost the
longevity of the species.
The stars provide us a number of things that Lauren (and, judging from her interviews around Sower,
Butler herself) thinks we need. The stars guarantee us safety from any local disaster. A humanity
spread across many worlds is free from the extinction threat of rogue asteroids, or nuclear war, or
superdisease, or supervolcanos, or climate change, or anything else you could name—a human species
spread safely across many worlds could perhaps survive as long as the universe itself. Earthseed both
exceeds and subverts the Anthropocene by turning human beings into galactic actors, not limited to
any one planet’s history or ecology. Additionally, the struggle involved in the flight to the stars—the
struggle to build the spaceships in the first place, the struggle to get there, the struggle to adapt the
new environment to our needs, the struggle to adapt ourselves to the new environment—will spur
humanity’s growth as a species and prevent us from exploiting, raping, killing, and otherwise
immiserating each other in the meantime (as Butler misanthropically believes we will do, in the
absence of some larger common purpose).4 While somewhat pessimistic in its assumptions, and
inflected by an Anthropocenic fear of the possibility of human extinction, the Parables series can be
seen from one perspective to be in line with the utopian optimism of much twentieth-century science
fiction, which by and large took the eventual emergence of a human-centered civilization in outer
space as a foundational assumption (as in that paradigmatic liberal cosmopolitan future, Star Trek).
But Sower is filled with paradoxical indications that its protagonist’s vision may be fundamentally
flawed that would be much more at home with a resistant thinker of the Anthropocene like Yusoff,
beginning with its opening pages. The opening sequence of Sower describes a recurring dream in which
Lauren is learning to fly, but she becomes trapped in a burning house before she is able to master it,
ultimately succumbing to the flames (Butler 1993: 4). This is a barely sublimated version of the conflict
that drives political debate in both books in the series: first, can you get off the planet before humanity
destroys it (through war or climate change or stupidity or anything else), and, second, should you get
off the planet before humanity destroys it, that is, should your ambition be to escape in a tiny utopian
enclave called the Earthseed rocket while the rest of humanity burns and chokes and starves and dies?
What looks from one angle like a species destiny looks from another like the destiny of a tiny,
privileged few that considers itself the whole species, or at least the only part of the species that really
matters.

This problem, an undercurrent throughout Sower, becomes totally inescapable for us when we get
to Parable of the Talents, which functions as a deconstruction of the commitments of the first novel.
Characters in both books, but especially in Talents, repeatedly demand from Lauren an answer as to
how she can possibly justify any expenditure on a blue-sky project like Earthseed when the entire
planet is in ruins and everything is getting worse. The second book hits us over the head with this
problem, over and over again—why, Lauren’s daughter asks, can she not see her dreams of a heaven in
outer space are “pathetically unreal” (Butler 1998b: 150)? “The Earthseed Destiny,” another character
denounces, “is an airy nothing. The country is bleeding to death in poverty, slavery, chaos, and sin. This
is the time for us to work for our salvation, not to divert our attention to fantasy explorations of
extrasolar worlds” (170). Her own husband cannot tolerate Lauren’s “immaturity, my irrational,
unrealistic faith in Earthseed, my selfishness, my shortsightedness” (145). There are dozens of
incidents like this across the text, and none of them is ever really answered. In fact, Lauren’s daughter,
the bitter narrator of the text who is gathering all these voices together, agrees wholeheartedly with
her mother’s detractors.
It is common of course for narratives to contain antagonists, even strong and convincing antagonists,
for the protagonists to overcome. But the events of Talents leave us with the impression that these
antagonists have a compelling case that Lauren has simply not refuted convincingly. Even in the
moment of Lauren’s triumph, there is an inescapable sense that Earthseed has turned its back on
something that is also vital, that the realization of the Earthseed destiny entails the retreat from the
real-world political effort to make people’s lives better (even while little in the novel suggests realworld struggle might be effective in averting continued disaster). There is thus no real, collective future
for humanity in either direction.5 I would suggest the final refusal of the novel to allow Lauren’s
proposed new human universal to “subsume particularities” or to remain silent on the unequal
distribution of the violence of the Anthropocene—to overlook the suffering of the raced, classed,
gendered, and (dis)abled bodies who are capital’s victims—is part and parcel of Butler’s Afrofuturist
intervention in science fiction, which cannot allow the utopian progress narrative called “colonialism”
to go unchallenged, even at the cost of making a character Butler intensely personally identified with
quite unhappy, and even at the cost of ruining the futurological space-colonialist fantasy she had
enjoyed as a lifelong fan of American science fiction (and of Star Trek in particular).
At the end of the novel, Lauren’s last journal entries read as an exercise in convincing herself that she
has done the right thing and lived the right kind of life. Her last journal entry in the main time period of
the novel (2035) has her giving up on any purpose but the Destiny, including finding her kidnapped
daughter: “I’ve always known that sharing Earthseed was my only purpose” (Butler 1998b: 430–1).
Then the narrative jumps forward sixty years, to the launch of the first Earthseed ship, conveniently
skipping over the years in which Lauren toiled endlessly to make this happen. Her last journal entry
(dated July 20, 2081) both begins and ends with her assertion that “I know what I’ve done”—an
assertion of pride that concedes a nagging doubt. The ship, with its crew in cryogenic hibernation, is
leaving Earth for a distant star, never to return; it has left human history (on all scales, from individual
life to the lives of societies and nations to the geological Anthropocene in all its yawning totalizing), for
something else that no one left behind will ever know. Even the name of the spaceship rings a sour
note: against Lauren’s wishes the ship has been christened the Christopher Columbus, suggesting that

the Earthseeders aren’t escaping the nightmare of history but are bringing it with them instead—not
solving the problem, but simply starting the Capitalocene all over again somewhere else (444–6).

The Fermi Paradox and the Great Filter

That Butler was never able to complete the novels that would have followed Talents, beginning with
her much-anticipated Parable of the Trickster, suggests that the consensus future of interstellar
colonization may no longer be cognizable to us in concrete terms, or as anything but pure fantasy.
Despite its prevalence in NASA’s branding and self-promotion, manned space flight is no longer a
priority for the organization; the missions to the moon stalled after only a few years, and the
anticipated follow-up missions to Mars, the asteroid belt, and beyond have remained only dreams.
Current plans for manned space missions to Mars, only fragmentary, typically describe one-way trips—
hardly the stuff of an intergalactic “Federation” or space empire—and very rarely entail anything like a
rational cost-benefit analysis in terms of what we back on Earth might get out of such projects.
Travel beyond the solar system, as so commonly depicted in 1950s and 1960s science fiction, has
become almost unthinkable in the years since the ecological turn of the 1970s; as Kim Stanley
Robinson (2012: 328) writes in his recent 2312: “Sorry, but it’s true . . . the stars exist beyond human
time, beyond human reach. We live in this little pearl of warmth surrounding our star; outside it lies a
vastness beyond comprehension. The solar system is our one and only home.” Human history is
earthbound—and so Earthseed’s ambition to conquer the stars (and its myriad echoes across the
history of science fiction) is in the end as much the nullification of the possibility of historical change as
it is any type of realization of it. We live on the Earth; if there’s any change, it’s got to happen down
here, not out there.
However, within the white settler logic of progress, which assumes perpetual growth fueled by
permanent expansion and endless resource extraction, a terrestrial-bound species can appear just as
much a nullification of history as an intergalactic one. For humanity to flicker and die on Earth, and to
leave no trace of itself save its garbage and the geological echo of incomprehensible mass extinction,
reads to many as a crime against the specialness of our species (not to mention all the other species
we’ve made extinct just to get this far). As H. G. Wells’s characters put it at the end of his script
for Things to Come (dir. William Cameron Menzies, 1936): “Conquest beyond conquest. . . . all the
depths of space and all the mysteries of time . . . all the universe or nothing.” The burning need for
species immortality through interstellar colonization, to “annex the planets,” as British imperialist Cecil
Rhodes so famously dreamed (quoted in Csicsery-Ronay 2003: 234)6 is so naturalized that it has even
become a research problem in speculative science. Enrico Fermi’s famous articulation of the so-called
Fermi Paradox—where is everybody?—remains unsolved. Given our assumptions about the age of the
universe, the likely prevalence of life in the universe, the likelihood of an intelligent species like human
beings evolving on a vital world, and the ease with which even a single intelligent species could
“colonize” the entire galaxy (if only using self-replicating drones), why do we appear to be alone?7 Why
haven’t the aliens shown up, or, rather, why haven’t they been here all along? What explains the
“Great Silence” of the stars? The answer must be somewhere in our assumptions—and the most likely
answer, according to many who read the problem, is that some blockage must inevitably intervene
before species achieve their “destiny” in the stars. This “Great Filter” (Hanson 1998) might be located
in humanity’s evolutionary past—making us the first possible inheritors of the galaxy—but there is no
particular reason to think this is the case. And, if it lies in our future, then within the logic of the Fermi

Paradox some sort of near-term catastrophe seems inevitable—a sense of impending doom that not
only accords with every indication from the scientific community but is also strongly reinforced by
mass-culture ideological messaging about the imminence of nuclear war that dates back to the 1940s.
One “solution” to the Fermi Paradox thus universalizes our society’s sense of crisis as a law of
civilization as such: civilizations all eventually destroy themselves, and so our time must be coming any
day.
The Anthropocene/Capitalocene is, therefore, the realization that humans are causing the disaster of
their own extinction through the very technological innovations that seemed, for a time, like they were
going to save us from this fate. Oil capitalism is revealed as, in fact, an unthinkable disaster, the
“resource curse” that plagues oil-rich nations enlarged to a planetary scale. Technoculture, in Lauren
Berlant’s (2011: 1) well-known terminology, becomes a cruel optimism: “A relation of cruel optimism
exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing.” Here the attachment is to
that “consensus future” of ever-increasing social and technological progress, which has been linked
historically to carbon-based energy resources that are both known to be running out and, at the same
time, dangerously destabilizing the climate.8 Because we now face a problem so immense, so intricate,
and so massively distributed in time and space that there seems nowhere we could begin to unravel it
(even if we had the political will to do it, which we don’t) the future seems to us now like a series of
ever-escalating, near-term disasters threatening not only our individual lives but the existence of the
species as such. This “all-in” character of climate change (and its associated crises like ocean
acidification, ongoing mass extinction, food shortage, and massive drought) is such a radical
destabilization of the usual stakes of politics and history as we have experienced them that it reveals
itself to us, when we allow ourselves to think of it at all, as a sublime terror. Hence the popularity in
our time of zombie worlds, what I have elsewhere called necrofutures (Canavan 2014): anticipatory
premeditations of a coming collapse that range from the immensely popular comic and television
series The Walking Dead to Cormac McCarthy’s Pulitzer Prize–winning The Road (2006) to Alfonso
Cuarón’s Children of Men (2006), Wanuri Kahiu’s Pumzi (2010), Christopher Nolan’s Interstellar (2014),
and Bong Joon Ho’s Snowpiercer (2014), to Suzanne Collins’s young-adult trilogy The Hunger Games,
to Avengers: Infinity War (2018), and even to children’s films like WALLE (2008), 9 (2009), Frozen (2013), and Moana (2016) (and on and on). Trapped within a cruelly
optimistic attachment to a consensus future of interstellar freedom that no longer seems viable, the
only remaining alternative seems like a world of abject misery, trending toward inevitable and
universal death.

Part Two: Anthropocene Utopias

Where then does the idea of utopia persist in the neo-Romantic melancholy of the Anthropocene, an
era where the extinction and disappearance of human beings now seems so inevitable, and has been
so thoroughly rehearsed, as to be a catastrophe that has already happened? How does one imagine
utopia when both the collapse and the continuation of the present conditions of society seem like
equally horrific necrofutures? One response has surely been a retreat into pure fantasy: the recasting
of the ecological crisis into fantastic monsters in such films as Pacific Rim (2013) and the
recent Godzilla reboots (2014, 2019). In such films we have a phenomenon that arises out of the
ocean—relics of an earlier, hotter age, or creatures born in the intense heat of some hellish alternative

dimension—to threaten coastal cities: a plain allegory for rising sea levels. And the threat is explicitly
our extinction; the stirring call to arms from Idris Elba’s character in Pacific Rim, echoed in the viral art
that promoted the film before its release, is the heroic announcement that we are in fact “cancelling
the apocalypse.” Utopian and anti-utopian frames stack uncomfortably in such escapist works. First,
there is the utopian kernel: the fantasy at the heart of Pacific Rim is the dream-wish that climate
change could be transformed into something we could literally fight. Much of the film luxuriates in this
fantasy, from the construction of the giant Jaeger robots used to fight the kaiju monsters, to the
repeated scenes of battle in which they slug it out, to the scenes of wartime collectively, solidarity, and
human cooperation that occur both within and between the violence. (The central trope of the film,
after all, is the neural collection that allows people to work in perfect synthesis for a common goal,
without all those messy debates and competing interests.) If the threat of climate change were an alien
invasion, we could just build weapons and armies to fight it, and maybe we could win. That utopian
vision is matched immediately by the anti-utopian realization that in fact this is the only type of
problem our political institutions know how to solve. Despite nominal calls to cut government spending,
neoliberal governments, most especially that of the United States, seem to have endless resources for
the military, for police, for jails, and for violence. We have an established system for developing and
constructing superweapons; in fact Congress frequently insists that the military invent and massproduce new weapons even when the Pentagon itself says it doesn’t want them. The security state is a
ripe site for very lucrative investment, as well as a means by which existing relations of inequality are
secured. But there is no such leverage point against an immaterial, inhuman, and geologically sublime
problem like climate change, whose solution entails the end of capitalism itself; rather, climate change
requires such a multitude of changes on every level of our society, all requiring massive government
intervention in the market of the sort neoliberalism tells us is simply inconceivable, that we have
nowhere to begin and no political will to try. Thus, even “happy crisis” figurations of climate change
like Pacific Rim collapse in the end into cosmic pessimism, as we realize that the dream logic of the
fantasy solution has no analogue in reality.
Another recurrent vision of utopia, which also unravels as a political project, might be called the utopia
of the animals: Quiet Earth stories where human beings deliberately exterminate themselves in order
to save the rest of the planet from destruction. “The Last Flight of Dr. Ain,” by Alice Sheldon (writing as
James Tiptree, Jr.), from 1969, is an early example of the form; more recent examples include the
film Twelve Monkeys (1995) and the titular first book in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake series
(2003), both of which also see scientists deliberately releasing superviruses in the name of killing off
humanity before it has permanently destroyed the environment. As Christina Alt (2015) has noted, in
Wells’s fiction the extinction of other animals was taken as a marker of the future’s utopian potential, a
token of humanity coming into its full powers as ruler of the planet, a logic that has recurred across
twentieth and twenty-first century attempts to eradicate undesired pests. In the Anthropocene,
however, this logic is now reversed; it is we who are the planetary disease that needs to be removed in
order for life to continue. Ramin Bahrani’s short film “Plastic Bag” (2009), narrated in the wonderfully
melancholic register of Werner Herzog as the interior voice of the bag, is a particularly evocative
example of this kind of fantasy. The plastic bag is acquired at a typical late capitalist superstore (a
Walmart, perhaps) to carry the customer’s goods home; used briefly to carry food to and from work
and tennis practice, the bag is ultimately used to pick up a dog’s excrement, discarded into the trash,

and taken to a landfill. But the bag is immortal, as the plastic it is made of will never disintegrate—and
so the film takes us on a million-year tour of the Anthropocene following the total disappearance of
human beings, as the bag is blown by the wind through a now-empty Earth before ultimately coming
to rest in the Great Pacific Garbage Patch. The bag, initially horrified by animal life, eventually comes to
value animals more than even itself—and so in the film’s stunning final moments the bag calls back
through time to its creators in the name of its own negation, saying “I wish you had created me so I
could die.” In such texts as these the neo-Romanticism of our moment reigns supreme, producing a
depressive utopian vision of a particularly antihumanist sort; our recognition of the sacredness of
animal life and our guilt over mass extinction lead to an anguished desire for collective suicide, as the
only way to stop “us” from killing again and again and again and again.9
Two related subgenres of utopian speculation offer us a way out of this seemingly hopeless impasse.
The first is another twenty-first-century recast of a familiar science-fictional novum, this time the
fantasy of the transformed posthuman. The sequels to Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (The Year of the
Flood [2009] and MaddAddam [2013]) ultimately take such a tack. In the original Oryx and Crake the
mad scientist Crake eliminated humanity via a supervirus in the name of preserving the planetary
future. He allowed only a tiny reserve of humans to continue in the form of his “Crakers,” creatures
who had been genetically engineered to live in only ecologically sustainable ways and to never overrun
their niche. The Crakers are so limited and uncreative, so bound up in the animalistic instincts Crake
has programmed into them, that they at first seem totally alien, even inhuman—and it is only as we
discover that Crake has effectively failed in his mission to engineer out the spark of human creativity
that they begin to seem like worthy successors to humanity. In the sequels, the overarching pessimism
of the first novel is dulled by positing the possibility of a union between a small number of old-style
humans who survived the plague and the Crakers, offering a new direction for the future beyond the
ceaseless, self-defeating accumulation of the Capitalocene. In MaddAddam, a third utopian term is
added: the pigoons (pigs spliced with human and baboon DNA that unexpectedly possess the ability to
communicate with the Crakers telepathically), a form of animal life given voice and able to advocate
for itself directly—calling not for our deaths, as with the utopia of the animals, but for our cooperation,
and for an ethics of mutual care.
A parallel fantasy, albeit one retaining a somewhat more Mephistophelean edge, occurs at the end of
Paolo Bacigalupi’s The Windup Girl (2009). The Windup Girl is a post-peak-oil novel; the world has been
destroyed by climate change, the loss of fossil fuels, and the loss of agricultural diversity abetted by
genetically modified foods, leading to a long period of crisis. The novel depicts an attempt to jumpstart
the resumption of global capitalism by Western agricultural corporations looking to raid Thailand’s
“food bank,” a narrative that only ends in yet another apocalyptic vision, the flooding of Bangkok. But
the epilogue of the novel points us in a different direction. Emiko, the “Windup Girl” of the title, is
another genetically engineered human—here, a sex slave. But the destruction of Bangkok opens up
new space in which New People like Emiko might thrive, abetted by the book’s own Crake-like mad
scientist, Gibbons. And like the Crakers, the New People can live in the broken, disease-ridden world
that the humans have created, when even we cannot; the animal traits spliced into their genome make
them faster, smarter, more observant, more disease resistant, even more loyal: “Someday, perhaps, all
people will be New People and you will look back on us as we now look back at the poor Neanderthals”
(Bacigalupi 2009: 358). Having produced in Emiko a complex and nuanced character who

simultaneously critiques and reproduces the exoticized, eroticized figure of an alluring Asian Other, the
book’s ambiguous prophecy can thus be read as both promise and threat to its assumed Western
reader—simultaneously a vision of liberation and of extermination.
In my longer reading of Atwood’s Oryx and Crake series I make reference to the famous Franz Kafka
quote that comes down to us by way of Walter Benjamin (1969: 116): “there is plenty of hope, infinite
hope, but not for us.”10 We might recast this proverb as an opportunity rather than a curse:
there is hope for us, so long as we become something other than the “us” we are now. Visions of
posthuman ecotopias like the ones imagined by Atwood and Bacigalupi—or elsewhere in science
fiction, as in the modified humans in the ecotopian future of Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of
Time (1976) or the all-female clones of Tiptree’s “Houston, Houston, Do You Read?” (1976)—thus
allegorize the amount both individuals and consumer society as a whole will have to change for there
to be any kind of human future at all. This is the other face of Haraway’s “Chthulhucene,” its
unexpected utopian charge: the future will be monstrous, yes, but it will also be vital, explosively alive,
all the more so for no longer being Capital- or Anthro-. One need think only of the aliens Butler created
in the series that preceded her Parables, the Xenogenesis or “Lilith’s Brood” trilogy (a favorite of
Haraway’s), which sees the (Lovecraftian) Cthulhoid “Oankali” actually achieve the settler-colonialist,
Earthseed dream of traveling the galaxy over countless millennia—a feat they are able to achieve
precisely through their constant adaptability and pliability, which prevents them from ever becoming
ossified by a particular set of cultural or biological assumptions—the authors of a billion Oankali
Anthropocenes (see Butler 2000 and Haraway 1990).
Such allegorical texts invite us, in Fredric Jameson’s (2005: 232) well-known formulation, to “think the
break”—to begin to imagine historical difference in an era that constantly asserts that the future has
only one possible path. In an era variously marked as postmodernity, the end of history, and capitalist
realism (see especially Fischer 2009), all of which amount to the hopeless unfurling of a single
foreclosed future, such radically alternative futures perform a vital role of refusing the death sentence
of “a History that we cannot imagine except as ending, and whose future seems to be nothing but a
monotonous repetition of what is already here” (Jameson 2003). The view from the Anthropocene
looks back at us from a perspective entirely compatible with a capitalist realist future; science fiction’s
definitional insistence on “historical mutability” and “utopian possibility”11 has the potential to
interrupt this spirit of inevitability and, as Jameson euphorically puts it, “jumpstart the sense of history
so that it begins again to transmit feeble signals of time, of otherness, of change, of Utopia.” If, in the
Anthropocene, whiteness cannot see any difference between its own extinction and the extinction of
all living things, such stories offer us an alternate path: the end of whiteness as the necessary
guarantor of a living future.
What then of stories that attempt to imagine a postcapitalist future in terms that are not allegorical or
fantastically posthuman, requiring some radically explosive break in history, but are instead simply
mundane narratives of social evolution? What of stories that take the postcolonial multiplicity of the
human species as a given, rather than trembling in shock and horror at a history that does not
teleologically center coloniality, modernity, or whiteness? In Kim Stanley Robinson’s edited
anthology Future Primitive: The New Ecotopias, the stories work as “thought experiments” and
“historical simulations” that are utopian in the sense that they “assume that differences in our actions

now will lead to real and somewhat predictable consequences later on—which means that what we do
now matters.” Science fiction—inflected by ecological rationality—is therefore an important part of “a
race to invent and practice a sustainable mode of life before catastrophe strikes us” (Robinson 1994:
9). These stories take up the gaze from the Anthropocene, but in a different mode than neo-Romantic
melancholy, zombie pessimism, or unhinged fantasy. One in particular stands out as a response to the
pessimism of the Anthropocene. Ernest Callenbach’s “Chocco” is an elegy for the “Machine People,”
our society, which has been supplanted not by posthuman genomic chimeras but by resurgent
primitivism. The story turns the logic of social and biological developmentalism on its head: “It is a
daunting task to try and understand a people who lived almost a thousand years ago,” says the
Memory Keeper of the River People. “But one thing we must keep uppermost in our minds: the
Machine People were no less intelligent than we are. After all, they had the same brains we have, the
same physiology exactly” (Callenbach 1994: 193). What has been transformed is not human biology
but human systems of social valuation; the collapse of late capitalism and technological modernity
more generally has therefore not meant universal extinction but rather the supersession of one
historically and environmentally situated strategy for social organization among many.
The effect is similar to the sublime ending of George R. Stewart’s classic apocalyptic novel Earth
Abides (1949), which sees straggling survivors in a plague-ravaged United States diverging over
subsequent decades into culturally distinct tribes, in ecosophic accordance with the resources and
environments nearby: here they fish, here they keep horses, here they use bows, here they don’t . . .
(Stewart 2006: 331–2). Ursula K. Le Guin’s Always Coming Home (1985) likewise imagines far-future
Californians who have mostly rejected the totalizing and genocidal assumptions of white-settler
ideology and destructive technology in favor of ways of life inspired by Indigenous practices that are
outside the mindless, endless expansion of commerce mandated by capitalist modernity. These people
understand themselves as our successors, but not our descendants. These rejections of our all-ornothing attachment to a monolithic present, as dually promoted by both the ideology of capitalist
realism and by the assertion of the Anthropocene/Capitalocene, fracture a doomed singular futurehistory for humanity back into vibrant multiplicity. They even open up the happy possibility of
a nonextinctive Anthropocene, one more resonant with an understanding of the concept that begins
deep in prehistory rather than in the so-called Enlightenment, in the nineteenth century, or in 1945:
the sustainable, Indigenous Anthropocene of pre-Columbian forestry practices, a reframing of deep
time that suggests the ingenious human capacity for world-transformation need not always be
identical to destructive, exploitative, and global death—an alternative vision of futurological possibility
that is also quite resonant with Yusoff’s Billion Black Anthropocenes, as well as with the optimistic
account of postcolonial futurity that Grace Dillon and others have called Indigenous futurism.12
In Robinson’s own recent fiction his insistence on historical mutability and the ongoing possibility of
utopian transformation of the social order has grown somewhat more jaundiced since his earliest
novels, but it nonetheless remains a vitally important theme—and one much more focused on the
exhilarating possibilities of technology than the neo-primitivist narratives he trumpeted in Future
Primitive. His 2312 reflects a rewriting of the assumptions of his famously utopian Mars trilogy (1990s);
the technological innovations of those books are retained, but the social revolutions have not
occurred, resulting in a solar system much more class divided and ecologically devastated than in the
earlier books. As a result, the economy of the solar system is fractured: unfathomable wealth for those

living in orbital satellites and on other planets but misery for “Earth, the planet of sadness”
(Robinson 2012: 303–4). You can’t terraform a planet where people are currently living; therefore
Earth languishes in poverty, starvation, and misery, while an unfathomably rich elite aggressively
remakes the rest of the solar system in their image. The terrestrial ecosystem sputters in the throes of
climate change; in protected satellites, the last dredges of animal life orbit the planet in sanctuaries,
the few scattered exceptions to a global mass extinction event. Like Butler’s Parables, 2312 thus
attempts to think the old consensus future without overlooking its omissions and its injustices or
erasing the victims of the storm called progress—to wriggle out of the mood of despair that
characterizes the Anthropocene and recover at least some of the techno-utopian futurological
ambition that once characterized science fiction, without forgetting the lessons we’ve learned since.
What we see in 2312 is therefore a renewed sense of historical possibility: a decent future for all
humanity is neither blithely assumed nor preemptively foreclosed. Interstitial chapters throughout the
novel read like fragmented encyclopedia entries, commenting on the events of 2312 from a
perspective decades or centuries hence, trying to make sense of the radical historical break that was
about to come. Over the course of the novel, characters from the solar system fulfill this
encyclopedia’s utopian historical memory, banding together to begin to undo the damage centuries of
the Capitalocene have wrought: the economic system of the solar system is reformed, environmental
protection and restoration become a priority on Earth, the animals are returned in a wonderful scene
that sees them descending from their orbital zoos back to Earth like a kind of reverse Ascension.
Crucially, though, the book is not a fantasy of return but rather an accelerationist fantasy of going
further, pushing through capitalism into some happier postcapitalist era.132312 is a relatively rare
contemporary example of a “good” technofuture, a posthuman paradise characterized by implanted
technology and wild body modifications (which are depicted as advancements and augmentations of
freedom and creativity); an explosion in gender categories that doesn’t result in homo- or transphobic
panic but that is in fact essentially irrelevant to the plot, in the best possible sense; open
experimentation with genetics in terrarium laboratories that is organicist and vital rather than
Frankensteinian, and doesn’t create monsters; hyperlongevity; postscarcity; neosocialism; an end to
racism—and the list goes on. The problem in 2312 isn’t that the good future is somehow secretly bad
but rather, as William Gibson once said, that it isn’t evenly distributed yet—and the struggle in 2312 is
therefore the struggle to develop that most crucial “survival technology” of all, justice (see
Robinson 2010: 213). Robinson’s ambition in 2312 is to extract some hope from the idea that we might
yet craft a truly universal human “we”—not the old erasure of all difference by whiteness, but the truly
multitudinous and polyvocal achievement of justice for all, for the first time.
Of course none of the book’s eventual reforms is some magic bullet; all are bitterly contested; the
work goes on, the encyclopedia from the future tells us, for decades or longer. It seems to continue
still, even in that future, better time. We should, perhaps, expect such an extremely prolonged sense
of history from a writer who, in Pacific Edge (1990), defined utopia as “struggle forever”
(Robinson 2013: 95); part of what politically revolutionary science fiction trains us to recognize is
precisely this endlessly renewing need for social change in the face of ever-changing historical
conditions. Despite our self-important fantasies about the supposed finality of our times, neither
human nor planetary history ever truly “ends.” Accordingly none of the encyclopedia entries offers
narrative closure, even on the level of form; all are fragmentary, beginning in medias res and ending

unpunctuated, cutting off before the moment of “culmination” or historical break can ever be
described fully. The end of every thought remains always just out of reach, always pure potential,
never actualized. Indeed, what may be most radically utopian about 2312 is precisely its absolute
refusal of narrative closure. “There is still and always the risk of utter failure and mad gibbering
extinction,” the book announces at its close; consequently, “There is no alternative to continuing to
struggle” (553). The deliberate lack of a period at the end of the sentence registers Robinson’s pointed
denial of any final pronouncement about the human project, endorsing neither pie-in-the-sky, head-inthe-sand utopianism nor the dejected, hopeless melancholy of the Anthropocene; instead, somewhere
in the muddled and disordered murk of history, one era ends, another begins, and the story goes on.

Conclusion

Of course the taxonomy of science-fictional replies to the assertion of the Anthropocene sketched here
does not account for every possible response to our ecological crisis, nor does it account for important
texts like N. K. Jemisin’s landmark Broken Earth series (2015–2017), the first trilogy to ever to win the
Hugo Award for Best Novel for each installment, or Richard McGuire’s inventively contemplative
graphic novel Here (2014), which both exist at the interstices of several of these categories. What this
article does register, I hope, is a general crisis in the way we represent and talk about the future on all
scales, from the scale of local community to the entirety of Planet Earth, both in our science and in our
science fiction. Like Fukuyama’s earlier “end of history,” the now-hegemonic assertion of the
Anthropocene too often names the future as a site of totalizing finality that is ultimately the silence of
a universal grave, for human and animal alike; the science fiction writers I discuss seek utopian
formulations that, as best they can, refuse that spirit of doomed necrofuturity. Reading the
Anthropocene by way of reading science fiction can help restore to the concept some of the political
optimism originally inherent in the concept as first articulated by Crutzen; the point, after all, was to
use the rhetoric of stratigraphy not bloodlessly or dispassionately but to shock the scientific
community into recognizing the true extent of humankind’s destabilization of the global climate and to
galvanize it as a political force:
Unless there is a global catastrophe—a meteorite impact, a world war or a pandemic—mankind
will remain a major environmental force for many millennia. A daunting task lies ahead for
scientists and engineers to guide society towards environmentally sustainable management
during the era of the Anthropocene. This will require appropriate human behaviour at all scales,
and may well involve internationally accepted, large-scale geo-engineering projects, for
instance to “optimize” climate. At this stage, however, we are still largely treading on terra
incognita. (Crutzen 2002: 23)
To call the Anthropocene a “daunting . . . terra incognita” is an understatement to say the least; as
discussed above, the sheer enormity and multiplicity of the ecological crisis can sometimes seem to
guarantee only a future of deprivation, suffering, and mass death (to say nothing of the dread, in 2020,
of seeing pandemic in Crutzen’s 2002 list of possible additional catastrophes). But the science fiction
texts I have discussed, from the techno-utopian to the neoprimitivist to the weird and otherworldly
Chthulucenic, speak back against this foreclosed future, and they help us restore a sense of possibility
and even opportunity to an Anthropocene that might otherwise look like a final pronouncement of

doom on the human species. They each call on us, in their own way, to remember that there is no
alternative to continuing to struggle, if we hope to cancel the apocalypse.

Notes

1 I will return to discuss the more utopian dimensions of this framing in my conclusion. Haraway says
the suggestion of Lovecraft’s incomprehensible elder gods is incidental, but regardless of her
intention the connection is inescapable.
2 The term dates to Donald A. Wollheim’s The Universe Makers: Science Fiction Today (1970), which
traces the development of this “consensus future” from Golden Age science fiction writers,
particularly Isaac Asimov. Kim Stanley Robinson also analyzes the consensus future as a future
that failed in the introduction to his edited anthology Future Primitive, discussed in more detail
below.
3 The language here, from the perspective of a character born in the 1970s and writing after the 2030s,
is an attack on ecological denialism; while most take the Pox as “accidentally coinciding” crises,
he understands them instead as the product of a “refusal to deal with obvious problems”
(Butler 1998b: 8–9).
4 In an interview with Larry McCaffery in Across the Wounded Galaxies (1990), Butler makes all this
explicit: “I think we humans need to grow up, and the best thing we can do for the species is to
go out into space. . . . we can use the stresses of learning to travel in space and live elsewhere—
stresses that will harness our energies until we’ve had time to mature” (69–70).
5 This is unhappily true in a metatextual sense as well; despite dozens of attempts to write a sequel
over nearly a decade, Butler found herself completely unable to continue the story.
6 Csicsery-Ronay in turn finds the quote in Hardt and Negri’s 2000 Empire (221).
7 Although commonly attributed to offhand, conversational remarks by Fermi, the first formal write-up
of the paradox was Michael H. Hart’s “An Explanation for the Absence of Extraterrestrials on
Earth” (1975).
8 “The nightmare, in good nightmare fashion, has something absurd and nearly inescapable about it:
either we will begin running out of oil, or we won’t” (Kunkel 2008).
9 Ted Chiang’s transcendent “The Great Silence” (2016), one of the most harrowing and sad short
stories yet published in the Anthropocene, is thus this utopia in negative: the Arecibo telescope
fruitlessly looking for aliens is the occasion for a parrot to ruminate on humanity’s murderous
indifference toward the thinking, feeling co-inhabitants of its own home planet.
10 For the extended reading of the Oryx and Crake series, see Canavan 2012.
11 The quoted terms are two of the three categories linking critical theory to science fiction in Carl
Freedman’s essential Critical Theory and Science Fiction (2000); the third of these is “material
reducibility,” also a key component of ecological thinking in the Anthropocene (xvi).
12 See Dillon 2012, as well as the special double-issue of Extrapolation on Indigenous futurism she
coedited with Michael Levy and John Rieder in 2016. For a reading that importantly
problematizes the tendency in climate change narratives to place Indigenous peoples “in
historical categories designed by non-Indigenous persons” in ways that actually recenter
whiteness and settler ideology, see Whyte 2018.
13 See, among other places, Shaviro 2015, where he notes that for the accelerationist “the only way
out [of capitalism] is through” (2).
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